In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents' utilities. In this paper, a non-cooperative game for three agents, based on bilateral offers, is presented. The ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule arises in subgame perfect equilibrium as the agents have more time to reach an agreement.
Introduction
In bargaining problems, a rule satisfies ordinal invariance if it does not depend on order-preserving transformations of the agents' utilities. For two agents, Shapley (1969) shows that no efficient rule, apart from the dictatorial one, satisfies ordinal invariance. However, this negative result does not hold any more for more than two agents. Shubik (1982) first documents an efficient, symmetric, and ordinal invariant rule for three agents. Even though there is no reference on the origin of this rule in Shubik (1982) (Kalai, 1977 ) and the Kalai-Smorodinsky rule (Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975) , and moreover it is the only symmetric member of a class of ordinal monotone path rules. Kıbrıs (2004a) also shows that the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule is deeply related to a family of solutions defined by Bennett (1997) for the class of multilateral bargaining problems.
Moreover, Kıbrıs (2012) characterizes the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule using a weaker version of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (Nash, 1950) .
On the other hand, Samet and Safra (2005) Finally, a mixed approach is given by Calvo and Peters (2005) , who study situations where there exist ordinal and cardinal agents.
The definitions of these values take a cooperative point of view, in the sense that it does not inquire about how the agents interact in order to agree on them. A complementary approach is to specify the details of negotiation by proposing non-cooperative games whose equilibria yield the desired values. This is the basis of the so-called Nash program, first suggested by Nash (1953) , and also related to the theory of implementation. Implementation in general environments is addressed by Moore and Repullo (1988) and Maniquet (2003) . See also Serrano (2005 Serrano ( , 2008 for two recent surveys on the Nash program.
A non-cooperative game yielding the ordinal Shapley value in subgame perfect equilibria for three agents is presented in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2005) . This non-cooperative game is based on a bidding mechanism by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001, 2002) . Another implementation for the three-player case is provided by Serrano (1993) for the nucleolus. See Binmore (1985) , Houba and Bennett (1997) and Buskens (2003) for other three-player non-cooperative models.
In this paper, we present a non-cooperative game whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation approaches the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule as the agents have more time to reach an agreement. As far as we know, no other similar result has been found for a purely ordinal rule.
Informally, the idea of the non-cooperative game is as follows: First, two of the agents decide a payoff allocation a la Rubinstein, i.e. by an alternatingoffer procedure, with no discount and with one round passing by each time an offer is rejected. However, each time an offer is rejected, the third agent has the choice to replace the agent that made the rejection. Once an offer (if any) is agreed upon, it constitutes a pre-agreement between the two agents who reached it. The other agent can then choose one of them and make her a counter-proposal, which in case of being accepted would cancel the preagreement. However, if the counter-proposal is rejected, the unchosen agent makes a last offer with the pre-agreement remaining as a status quo in case of rejection. Moreover, before either the counter-proposal or the pre-agreement is implemented, the agent that did not participate in it has an option of renegotiation, which makes the process to be repeated in the next round. If no agreement is reached after a pre-specified number of rounds, the process finishes with the status quo as the final payoff allocation.
As the number of rounds increases, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium whose payoff allocation approaches the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule.
Under reasonable assumptions on the behavior of the agents when they are indifferent (tie-breaking rules), this equilibrium is unique.
Notice also that random moves (such as a random choice of proposers) are never used. This is because we are working in a purely ordinal environment, where the set of feasible payoff allocations may be nonconvex. As opposed, in a cardinal environment, agents are usually assumed to follow von NeumannMorgenstern utility functions. Under them, each point in a segment between two feasible payoff allocations is also feasible because it can be achieved by a lottery.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the basic notation and definitions, as well as some preliminary results. In Section 3 we formally describe the non-cooperative game and provide the main results, as well as an overview of the proofs. In Section 4 we briefly study a possible extension to more than three agents. We present the main formal proofs in Section 5 (Appendix).
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of agents. Given x, y ∈ R N , x ≤ y means x i ≤ y i for all i ∈ N , x y means x i < y i for all i ∈ N , and x < y means x ≤ y and x = y. Let Π be the set of all permutations of N , with generic element π.
compact for all y ∈ R N and d belongs to the interior of S. A point x ∈ S is Pareto optimal in S if there is no y ∈ S such that x < y. Let P (S) denote the set of Pareto optimal points in S. A point x ∈ S is weakly Pareto optimal in S if there is no y ∈ S such that x y. Let W P (S) denote the set of weakly Pareto optimal points in S.
A bargaining problem (S, d) is strongly comprehensive if W P (S) = P (S) and for each x ∈ S, y ≤ x implies y ∈ S. Let B denote the set of all strongly comprehensive bargaining problems.
For each (S, d) ∈ B, x, y ∈ R N and N = {i, j, k}, agent i's aspiration payoff restricted to x j and y k is
and her aspiration payoff allocation restricted to x j and y k is
For simplicity, we write p t,ij instead of p t,ij (S, d). For notational convenience, p t,12 = p t,21 and so on.
Given {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3}, and in order to check the existence and uniqueness of each p 1,ij (case t > 1 follows an analogous reasoning), we consider
interior of S. Strong comprehensiveness of (S, d) implies that these functions are well-defined, continuous and strictly decreasing. Analogously, the func- 
, which is strictly negative, and It is easily checked (see Figure 1 ) that, given {i, j, k} = {1, 2, 3} and
. We also have
and p t,·i
and p
Moreover, notice that,
The sequence {p t } ∞ t=0 is uniquely defined and it is convergent. Also, for each i, j ∈ N ,
A bargaining rule F : B → R N assigns to each bargaining problem 
This bargaining rule is Pareto optimal, symmetric and ordinal invariant.
The non-cooperative game
We describe in detail the non-cooperative game depicted in the Introduction.
There are at most T negotiation rounds. If no agreement is reached after round T , the disagreement payoff allocation d is implemented 1 . At each round, the agents play the roles of first proposer, first responder, and pivot.
Say, w.l.o.g., that, in the first round, agent 1 is the first proposer, agent 2 is the first responder, and agent 3 is the pivot. Agent 1 proposes a payoff allocation x ∈ S. Agent 2 can then accept or reject this proposal.
A round passes by if agent 2 rejects this proposal. In this case, agent 3 can choose to replace agent 2, so that in the next round agent 1 keeps playing the role of first proposer, whereas agent 3 becomes the first responder and agent 2 becomes the pivot. In case agent 3 does not replace agent 2, then agent 2 plays the role of first proposer and agent 1 plays the role of first responder.
Notice that this protocol simply states that agents 1 and 2 alternate proposals until agent 3 decides (after a rejection) to replace the responder.
In case agent 2 accepts the proposal x, then agent 3 makes a counterproposal y ∈ S to either agent 1 or agent 2 (whoever agent 3 chooses). Let i be this agent and let j be the other one. Agent i should choose between the counter-proposal y and the pre-agreement x. Two cases are possible: In case of renegotiation, in the next round agent 3 plays the role of first proposer, agent i plays the role of first responder, and agent j plays the role of pivot.
At round T + 1, the game finishes and the final payoff allocation is d.
In order to fully formalize the non-cooperative game, a formal description is presented as follows (see also Figure 2 ). We denote the game as
where t is the number of rounds left (hence, we begin with B T (π)) and π ∈ Π is the order that specifies the roles: π 1 is the first proposer, π 2 is the first responder, and π 3 is the pivot. For simplicity, we write
The non-cooperative game is defined inductively on t. B 0 (π) is the trivial game with d as final payoff allocation.
Assume B s (σ) is defined for all s < t and all σ ∈ Π. Assume w.l.o.g.
Agent 1 proposes x ∈ S. Agent 2 can accept or reject.
If agent 2 rejects, agent 3 chooses between playing game B t−1 [132] or B t−1 [213] . If agent 2 accepts, agent 3 chooses i ∈ {1, 2} and proposes y ∈ S. Let j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} be the other agent.
Agent i can choose x or y. is played.
Notice that, in each round, any agreement (x, y or z) should be first achieved by two agents (x by agents 1 and 2, y by agents 3 and i, and z by agents 1 and 2 again). Once two agents have agreed upon a proposal, the third one has the choice to ask for a renegotiation and move to the next round. The only exception is given by agent 3 when z is chosen. In this case, agent 3 cannot ask for a renegotiation, but she can veto z and force the implementation of d.
Theorem 3.1 For any T > 0 and π ∈ Π, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium for the non-cooperative game B T (π) whose equilibrium payoff
An immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 3.1 As T increases, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in the non-cooperative game whose final payoff allocation approaches the payoff allocation given by the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule.
In general, there can be more than one subgame perfect equilibrium. However, the above subgame perfect equilibrium is unique under the following Assumptions:
The agents strictly prefer to finish in the earliest round.
Assumption 2 If the pivot (say k) is indifferent when choosing i, and x is such that k is bound to ask for renegotiating it, then k would choose the most harmful choice for the first proposer.
Assumption 1 follows from the fact that either a rejection or a renegotiation implies a delay. Hence, it seems natural that an agent would prefer to reach an agreement as soon as possible. Following this idea, Assumption 1 implies that, when an agent is due to receive the same final payoff when accepting or rejecting x, or whether she asks or not for a renegotiation, then she accepts and does not ask for a renegotiation. An equivalent assumption is to assume that all the agents have a lexicographic preference for the game ending in the first round. See Bag and Winter (1999, p. 79) for the intuition behind this assumption, which is also used in Mutuswami and Winter (2002) .
Another similar assumption is used in Moldovanu and Winter (1994), who assume that an agent prefers agreements which involve larger rather than smaller coalitions (provided her final payoff is the same in both agreements).
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) also assumed that agents "break ties in favor of quick termination of the game" 2 .
Assumption 2 is needed for T > 1 and it has the following justification: since x comes from the first proposer, and it is not satisfactory for the pivot (in the sense that she would prefer to ask for a renegotiation), the threat of harming the first proposer is justifiable and hence credible. Moreover, the payoff allocation would be strictly smaller for the pivot in subgame perfect equilibria not satisfying Assumption 2. If fact, if we assume a "cheap talk"
along the negotiation process, so that players can announce their intended strategies, it would be optimal for the pivot to announce that she would harm the first proposer in case x is not satisfactory, and to adhere to this announcement. Following Farrell and Rabin (1996) , such an announcement is self-committing in the sense that it creates incentives for the speaker to fulfill it. With this cheap talk, Assumption 2 is equivalent to the assumption that the agents strictly prefer to adhere to their own announcements. .
In the first case (x 3 ≥ p T,12 3
(1)
, and under an induction hypothesis, agent 3 is bound to accept x in case agent i chooses x twice. From this, the optimal z for agent j is a (S, x i , d 3 ) and that would be the final payoff allocation in the subgame that begins when agent j proposes z. Knowing that, the optimal y for agent 3 would be a S, x i , p T −1,·j j and that would be the final payoff allocation in the subgame that begins when agent 3 proposes y. This implies that an optimal x for agent 1 satisfies x ∈ P (S),
and a 3 S, x 1 , p
. These conditions imply x = p T,12 , which will make agent 2 indifferent between accepting or rejecting. The final payoff allocation will then be a S, p
Assumption 1 is needed in order for agent 2 to accept x = p T,12 , since there is no possibility for agent 1 to find another x around p T,12 which breaks this in- At this point, Assumption 2 is needed for T > 1 so that agent 3 makes the most harmful choice of i for agent 1, so that it is not profitable for agent 1 to choose x with x 3 < p T, 12 3 . If this happens, the final payoff for agent 3 would be strictly lower than p
T,·3
3 , which gives an additional justification for Assumption 2 to hold. In case all the responders accept x, then agent n makes a counterproposal y ∈ S to some agent i ∈ N \ {n} (chosen by agent n). Agent i should choose between the counter-proposal y and the pre-agreement x.
If agent i chooses y, then any of the other agents (they are The final subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation is given by y =
. Hence, an efficient ordinal payoff allocation is achieved, even though it does not coincide (for n > 3) with any of the payoff allocations presented by Safra and Samet.
Appendix
In this section we formally prove Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. We will use the following lemmas: 12 3 for some t ≥ 0. Then, max a 3 S, x 1 , p t, 13 2 , a 3 S, x 2 , p t,23 1 ≥ p t, 12 3 and, moreover, equality holds iff x = p t,12 .
Proof. Define three functions
→ R as follows:
We will compute the minimum of f . Under our hypothesis on S, f 1 (y)
is strictly decreasing in y 1 , whereas f 2 (y) is strictly decreasing in y 2 . Hence, f reaches a minimum when y ∈ P (S), y 3 = p t, 12 3 and f 1 (y) = f 2 (y), i.e.
y ∈ P (S) Lemma 5.2 Given t > 0,
and, moreover, this maximum is only achieved when x = p t,12 .
Proof. Let x ∈ S such that a 3 S, x 1 , p
Assume first x / ∈ P (S). Under the strict comprehensiveness of S, we can find some 1 , 2 > 0 such that x := (x 1 + 1 , x 2 + 2 , x 3 ) ∈ S and
. Hence, x ∈ P (S) is necessary to achieve the supremum.
Assume now x ∈ P (S) and x 3 > p t−1,·3 3
. Under the strict comprehensiveness of S, we can find some ε 1 > 0 such that
Hence,
is necessary to achieve the supremum.
Assume now x ∈ P (S),
Under the strict comprehensiveness of S, we can find some δ 1 , δ 2 > 0 such
We have to prove that x = p t, 12 . Under (1), these conditions are equivalent to x ∈ P (S)
which has a unique solution: x = p t,12 .
We now prove Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. For any t ≥ 0 and i, j ∈ N , i = j, let q t,ij ∈ R N be defined as q 0,ij ≡ d and q t,ij ≡ p t,ij otherwise. We will prove the following (stronger) result:
For any T ≥ 0 and π ∈ Π, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium for the non-cooperative game B T (π) whose payoff allocation is q T,π 1 π 3 . Moreover, this subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation is unique under Assumption 1 and Assumption
2.
Notice that, by definition, q Assume the result is true for less than T rounds, T > 0. The subgame that arises in the second round of the game with T rounds is strategically equivalent to the game with T − 1 rounds. Hence, the continuation payoff in the second round is known by the agents. Under the induction hypothesis,
is the continuation payoff in the second round when the order is
given by π ∈ Π.
We first prove that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium whose final payoff allocation is p T,13 .
Consider the following strategic profile in B T [123]:
• At the beginning of the round, agent 1 proposes x = p T,12 .
• Agent 2 rejects x iff x 3 ≥ p
• If agent 2 rejects x , agent 3 chooses
if T is even.
• If agent 2 accepts x, agent 3 chooses i and proposes y following the next rule:
, she chooses i = 1 if T is even and i = 2 if T is odd, and proposes y = p T −1,j3 .
-
, and proposes y = a S, x i , p
• After agent 3 chooses i and proposes y, agent i chooses either x or y following the next rule:
and y j < p T −1,·j j , she chooses x.
-If x 3 < p
and y j ≥ p
and y j < p
and y j ≥ p T −1,·j j , she chooses x iff x i > y i .
• If agent i chooses y, then agent j asks for renegotiation iff y j < p
• If agent i chooses x, then agent j proposes z following the next rule:
, she proposes z = a S, q
, she proposes z = a (S, x i , d 3 ).
• After agent j proposes z, agent i chooses either z or x following the next rule:
, she chooses z iff z i ≥ x i .
• After agent i chooses z, agent 3 vetoes iff z 3 < d 3 .
• After agent i chooses x, agent 3 asks for a renegotiation iff x 3 < p
In each B T −1 (σ), we apply the induction hypothesis and assume the agents play a subgame perfect equilibrium profile that gives as final payoff
Under (1) and the induction hypothesis, a backward reasoning shows that the above strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium after agent i chooses y and after agent j proposes z.
To see that the proposed choice of z is optimal for agent j, we distinguish two cases:
, then agent i can assure herself q
by choosing x.
Thus, the maximum that agent j can get by making an acceptable offer is a j S, q
. This is what she would get by choosing z = a S, q T −1,j3 i , d 3 , because it would induce agent i to choose z and agent 3 not to veto.
, then agent i can assure herself x i by choosing x. Thus, the maximum that agent j can get is a j (S,
. This is what she gets by choosing z = a (S, x i , d 3 ), because it would induce agent i to choose z and agent 3 not to veto.
Hence, the final payoff allocation in this subgame (when agent j proposes z) is given by a S, q
and by a (S,
Moreover, it is straightforward to check that, given y, the strategy of agent i is optimal for her.
We now check that the proposed choice of i and y is optimal for agent 3. Notice that, in case agent i chooses x, the strategies imply that the final payoff for agent 3 will be d 3 .
We have two cases:
, then y = p T −1,j3 and the strategies determine that agent i chooses y and agent j does not ask for a renegotiation, so that the final payoff for agent 3 is y 3 = p
. Hence, for such an x, the choice of i is indifferent. Moreover, this choice of y is optimal among those that induce agent i to choose y and agent j not to ask for a renegotiation.
, then y = a S, x i , p T −1,·j j and the strategies determine that agent i chooses y and agent j does not ask for a renegotiation, so that the final payoff for agent 3 is y 3 = a 3 S, x i , p
. Hence, for this y, the choice of i is optimal, so that the final payoff for agent 3 is max a 3 S, x 1 , p
. Moreover, this choice of y is optimal among those that induce agent i to choose y and agent j not to ask for a renegotiation. Under Lemma 5.1 and (1),
Hence, in both cases, agent 3 gets at least p
. There are two possible deviations: To induce agent i to choose y and agent j to ask for a renegotiation, and to induce agent i to choose x. In the first case, the induction hypothesis implies that the final payoff for agent 3 is p
, so she does not improve. In the second case, the strategies imply that the final payoff for agent 3 is d 3 , which is again not higher than p
We now check that the proposed strategy for agent 3, after agent 2 rejects
x, is optimal. Under the induction hypothesis, the final payoff for agent 3 is q We now check that the proposed rule followed by agent 2 to reject x is optimal. Under the induction hypothesis, the final payoff for agent 2 in case of rejection is p
, irrespectively of T being odd or even. For the payoff in case of acceptance, we have two cases:
, the final payoff for agent 2 in case of acceptance is
if T is odd and T > 1, and
Hence, agent 2 is indifferent when T is even or (since p 0,·2 2 = d 2 ) when T = 1. Under (2), she is strictly better by accepting when T is odd and T > 1.
, we have two subcases:
, the final payoff for agent 2 is p
. Hence, agent 2 is indifferent between accepting or rejecting. In particular, accepting is optimal.
(b) If a 3 S, x 1 , p
, the final payoff for agent 2 is x 2 . Hence, it is optimal to reject iff x 2 < p
We now check that x = p T,12 is an optimal proposal for agent 1. If she does not deviate, then agent 2 will accept, agent 3 will choose i = 1 and y = a S, x 1 , p
, agent i = 1 will choose y and agent j = 2
will not ask for a renegotiation, so that the final payoff for agent 1 will be
1 . Assume agent 1 deviates by proposing x with x 3 < p and a 3 S, x 1 , p
. Under (1) and Lemma 5.1,
, then agent 2 rejects x. If T is odd, agent 3 chooses and agent 1 does not improve.
, then the final payoff allocation is a S, x 2 , p
and agent 1 does not improve.
If T is even, under (2), p
but this not possible because
Assume now agent 1 deviates by proposing x = p T,12 with x 3 ≥ p
We know prove that p T,13 is the only subgame perfect equilibrium payoff allocation when Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 hold.
Assume we are in a subgame perfect equilibrium that satisfies Assumption 1 and Assumption 2. We proceed by a series of Claims:
. In the subgame that begins when j chooses z ∈ S, the final payoff allocation is a S, q
Proof. Since x 3 < p T, 12 3 , agent i can induce q T −1,j3 by choosing x, knowing that agent 3 is bound to ask for a renegotiation and hence force B T −1 [3ij].
Notice that, under the induction hypothesis, agent 3 would get p . In the subgame that begins when j chooses z ∈ S, the final payoff allocation is a (S, x i , d 3 ).
Proof. Since x 3 ≥ p T, 12 3 , agent i can assure herself x i by choosing x, knowing that agent 3 would not ask for a renegotiation (under Assumption 1 when If T is odd and T > 1, then p
